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employee although negligent or foolhardy in the act of abandonment has
done it innocently or to aid another in distress, (2) the abandonment is
slight and presents little or no detriment to the interests of the employer,
(3) estoppel element, although not mentioned specifically, in that if an
employer is aware of an employee's continually doing an act which con-
stitutes an abandonment and neither condemns nor condones such act, he
may be in effect estopped from using this as a defense and such act will be
considered "in the course," (4) where decedent is survived by a wife and
children a most liberal interpretation is to be expected. These factors are
by no means comprehensive, but one factor must be kept in mind - the
Workmen's Compensation Act is humanitarian in nature and the interests
of the worker are paramount.
John A. Luchsinger
THE FINANCIALLY IRRESPONSIBLE MOTORIST:
A SURVEY OF STATE LEGISLATION
Each year about 38,000 people are killed and another 1,200,000 are
injured as the result of motor vehicle accidents.' So long as liability for
these mishaps is based on the concept of fault, the financial resources of
the wrongdoer are of primary importance to the innocent victim or his
survivors. Once the accident has occurred and the fault has been deter-
mined, justice cannot be served if the successful plaintiff finds that the
tort-feasor is unable to respond in damages. This then is the problem of
the financially irresponsible motorist. Various solutions have been offered
by the state legislatures and it is to these developing answers that we turn
our attention with particular emphasis on the more recent developments.
As of this writing four types of statutes are in use in the United States
to protect the innocent victim from the judgment proof driver.2 They are:
(1) compulsory automobile liability insurance; (2) the financial responsi-
bility statutes; (3) the requirement that all automobile liability policies
contain clauses protecting the insured against financially irresponsible
motorists and (4) unsatisfied judgment fund laws.
1. Statistical Abstract of the U.S., pp. 65, 91 (1963). It is difficult to ascertain
the number and percentage of accidents involving uninsured vehicles and those in
which the uninsured party is at fault. Docket judgment statistics are misleading since
many suits never reach the litigation stage because of the prospective inability of the
defendant to respond in damages.
2. Many states do not limit themselves to one type of statute but combine two or
three plans, thus providing extensive protection for the victim of an uninsured driver.
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As far back as 1925 the legislature of the State of Massachusetts was
concerned with the inability of motor vehicle operators to answer for harm
caused by their carelessness on the road. On January 1, 1927, that body
passed an act 3 requiring every person registering a motor vehicle in the
state (a) to show a certificate stating that he had liability insurance or (b)
to produce a motor vehicle liability bond which guarantees that the regis-
trant will satisfy all judgments rendered against him arising out of the use
or operation of the motor vehicle or (c) to deposit cash, stock certificates
or bonds in the amount of $5,000 as security for the payment of all judg-
ments rendered against the vehicle owner for injury resulting from the
operation of his vehicle. In the event a liability policy purchased pursuant
to statutory requirements lapses during the registration period, upon notice
to the state by the insurer, the registration is revoked making subsequent
use of the vehicle within the state unlawful. In addition cancellation or
rescission by the insurer after the accident is made impossible by the
Massachusetts act which provides:
• . . no violation of the terms of the policy and no act of default of
the insured, either prior or subsequent to the issue of the policy, shall
operate to defeat or avoid the policy so as to bar recovery . . . by a
judgment creditor ... 4
In other words the policies become frozen after the loss; an absolute right
of recovery is given to the injured party and it is up to the insurer to recoup
his loss from the insured.
The only other states to adopt compulsory insurance schemes have
been North Carolina5 and New York,6 whose regulations are substantially
the same as those of Massachusetts, providing for revocation of registra-
tion in the event of policy lapse and enforcement of the various notice and
certifying provisions with criminal sanctions.
7
Since the adoption of the Massachusetts plan, charges and counter-
charges have been hurled over its efficacy. It has been alleged that com-
3. MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 90, §§ 34A, D, H, J (Supp. 1963) ; c. 175, §§ 113A, B, D
(Supp. 1963) ; ch. 175, §§ 113C, E, F, G (1959) ; ch. 90, §§ 34B, C, E, F, G, I (1959).
4. MASS. GEN. LAWS C. 175, § 113A(5) (1959).
5. It is interesting to note that no state followed the lead of Massachusetts for
over thirty years. This was due in part to strong opposition by the insurance lobby
in the state legislatures. At first blush it would seem that a compulsory insurance
scheme would increase their business but it must be remembered that the premium
rates for required polities are rigidly controlled by the state and many of the smaller
companies cannot operate on a financially sound basis under the low rates. See Grad,
Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLUM. L. Rxv. 300,
312-17 (1950).
6. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRLitc LAWS § 93-b (McKinney 1959).
7. The constitutionality of compulsory liability insurance has been sustained.
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pulsory insurance makes operators accident prone.8 A more substantial
charge is that compulsory insurance affords no protection against uninsured
out-of-state vehicles 9 not within the purview of the act. Again, the typical
liability insurance policy purchased pursuant to statutory requirement
offers no protection to the insured for injuries resulting from accidents
with stolen vehicles or those driven without the knowledge or permission
of the owner. Unregistered motor vehicles or registered ones which for
one reason or another do not carry the liability insurance required by the
act present additional problems.
These objections have apparently been sustained, for the use of the
compulsory insurance plan has been relatively limited. All three states
which have compulsory insurance acts have combined them with some
other type of statutory protection.
II.
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LEGISLATION
At present all fifty states have some form of financial responsibility
legislation.'0 These statutes can be divided into two classes: (a) those
which are triggered into operation by the happening and due reporting of
a motor vehicle accident involving personal injuries or property damage
exceeding a specified amount and (b) those which require an administra-
tive or judicial finding of fault before any sanctions are imposed.
In the former, any owner or operator of a motor vehicle which is
involved in an accident must, as a prerequisite to the continued use of his
drivers license or motor vehicle registration, furnish proof of his ability to
respond in damages for any personal injuries or property damage resulting
from the accident. This proof may be in the form of a liability insurance
policy (meeting certain state requirements), a bond or a deposit of cash or
securities in an amount deemed sufficient by a state officer to satisfy any
judgments arising out of the accident. If this proof of financial responsi-
bility cannot be established, the operator's license and in some cases the
motor vehicle registration will be suspended until the payment of any
judgments that may be rendered against the individual."
8. As a matter of fact, Massachusetts enjoys one of the lowest fatal accident
rates in the country. Statistical Abstract of the U.S., op. cit. supra note 1.
9. If other states had followed suit and enacted similar legislation the problem
might have been quite well resolved.
10. A complete list of citations is set forth in Kesler v. Department of.Public
Safety, 369 U.S. 153 at 165-69, nn.29-34 (1962). Also, see Ward, New York's Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation: Past, Present, and Future, 8 BUVFALO
L. Rgv. 215, 218 n.8 (1959). Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Provisions (which can be found at 75 P.S. § 1401 et seq.) make up Article 14 of The
Pennsylvania Vehicle Code of 1959 (1959, April 29, P.L. 58).
11. In Pennsylvania, the suspension remains in effect until: (1) the deposit of
the security required by the act, or (2) one year has lapsed following the date of
the accident and no action for damages has been instituted, or (3) a release from
liability or a final judgment of non-liability has been instituted or, (4) a warrant for
confession of judgment or a duly acknowledged written agreement providing pay-
ment of an agreed amount in installments has been executed. 75 P.S. § 1407 (1959:,
April 29, P.L. 58, § 1410).
COMMENTS
3
Jacobs: The Financially Irresponsible Motorist: A Survey of State Legisla
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
In the latter class of statutes, upon an administrative or judicial
finding of fault the negligent party must satisfy any judgment against him
within a certain period.' 2 As can be expected, upon one's failure to do so
an immediate revocation of driving and/or registration privileges occurs
which may remain in effect until satisfaction of the judgment.
Both the "one accident" and the "one judgment" type statutes have
many features in common. 13 For example, most provide for installment
payment of the judgments. 1 4 Upon payment of the initial amounts due the
license will be returned; to insure prompt payment of all installments as
they become due the license privileges are immediately revoked in the
event of default in any payment. Thus, in a state which has an installment
payment provision a defendant who is unable to pay a large judgment does
not face a semi-permanent loss of his driver's license (a device that may
offer no real assistance to the injured plaintiff in collection). Indeed, in
many states restoration of license and/or registration privileges may be
possible even without satisfaction of the judgment if the judgment creditor
consents' 5 and additional state requirements (to be discussed infra) are met.
However lenient a judgment creditor may prove to be upon the tort-
feasor, the state usually takes a more jaundiced view and thus as an
additional prerequisite to the return of one's driving or registration privi-
leges proof of future financial responsibility must be shown. That is, the
ability to respond in damages which may result from any accident in the
future must be demonstrated. This proof usually takes the form of a liability
insurance policy.' 6 In this light, of particular interest are statutory pro-
visions concerning cancellation and rescission of the policy both before and
after the future accident. Termination of a policy before an accident has
occurred creates only administrative problems which are handled by the
giving of timely notice by the insurer to the insured and the state.
17
12. Oiro Rsv. CODS §§ 4509.01-4509.99. Notification of an unsatisfied judgment is
usually given to the motor vehicle commission by a court clerk either (a) without
the creditor's direction or (b) only after the creditor requests notification in writing.
13. Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law combines the "one
accident" and "one judgment" type statutes. See 75 P.S. § 1404 (1959, April 29, P.L.
58 § 1404) and 75 P.S. § 1413 (1959, April 29, P.L. 58 § 1413).
14. TEx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701(h), § 7, subd. 3 (Vernon Supp. 1964).
Pennsylvania's installment payment provision is found in 75 P.S. § 1416 (1959, April
29, P.L. 58 § 1416).
15. Effective in 36 states and the District of Columbia, Kesler v. Department of
Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962). See 75 P.S. § 1413(b) (1959, April 29, P.L. 58
§ 1413) which provides:
If the judgment creditor consents in writing, in such form as the secretary may
prescribe, that the judgment debtor be allowed license and registration or non-
resident's operating privilege, the same may be allowed by the secretary, in his
discretion, for six (6) months from the date of such consent, and thereafter until
such consent is revoked in writing, notwithstanding default in the payment of
such judgment, or of any instalments thereof prescribed in section 1416 (supra
note 14) provided the judgment debtor furnishes proof of financial responsibility.
16. In Pennsylvania proof may be given by filing a certificate of insurance, a
bond or a certificate of deposit of money or securities. 75 P.S. § 1418 (1951, April 29,
P.L. 58 § 1418). However, it is the rare motorist who is willing to leave a deposit of
cash or securities with the motor vehicle bureau as proof of his responsibility.
17. It is of course up to the insured to renew his policy or obtain another, other-
wise he will suffer revocation or cancellation of his driving privileges. See 75 P.S.
[VOL. 10
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Difficult questions arise however when cancellation is sought by the insurer
after the accident because of an alleged breach of certain conditions in the
policy (e.g., misrepresentation by the insured regarding age). As is the
case in the compulsory insurance area, the statutes have granted the primary
rights to the injured parties. No violation of the terms of the policies and
no act of default by the insured either before or after the issuance of the
policy will operate to bar recovery by a judgment creditor from the insurer.
The policies become frozen or absolute after the loss and it is incumbent
upon the insurer to recoup his loss from the insured.18
Another common provision in many of the statutes is that of requiring
proof of financial responsibility by a person whose driving record is
marred by traffic violations, license suspensions and the like. Although the
individual may never have been involved in an accident the operating
privilege will be revoked if proof of financial responsibility is not forth-
coming. In theory, this clause has the effect of requiring liability insurance
of those most likely to become involved in motor vehicle litigation.'9
Probably the most controversial clause contained in nearly all financial
responsibility statutes20 is the provision that a discharge in bankruptcy
shall not be a substitute for satisfaction of the judgment. The license and/or
registration suspensions remain in effect in the face of the bankruptcy
discharge until complete payment of the judgments arising out of the motor
vehicle accident. This provision has been continually challenged 2' without
success under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution as
an attempt by the state legislatures to change the effect of the federal
bankruptcy law.
§ 1422 (1959, April 29, P.L. 58 § 1422) which states "... the insurance so certified
shall not be cancelled or terminated until at least ten (10) days after a notice of
cancellation or termination of the insurance so certified shall be filed in the office
of the secretary, ...".
18. Assuming a statute states that the policies become absolute after loss, there
are many questions as to the meaning and extent of these provisions. In the event
a liability policy protects the insured to the extent of $100,000 for one injury and up
to $300,000 for one accident but the state only requires a policy of $5,000 per injury
and $10,000 per accident, is the entire policy absolute or only the statutory amounts?
What if the policy is not a required one in that the insured has never been involved
in an accident or what is the result if the insured had no knowledge that the policy
was required? The case interpretations of the statutes have laid down a pattern of
partial absoluteness. Absolute yes, but only up to the statutory amounts (Farm Bur.
Auto Ins. Co. v. Martin, 97 N.H. 196, 84 A.2d 823 (1951)) ; when the policy has been
required by law. (Cohen v. Metro Casualty Ins. Co., 223 App. Div. 340, 252 N.Y.S.
841 (Sup. Ct. 1931) ; Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co. v. Breen, 2 App. Div. 2d 271, 153
N.Y.S.2d 732 (Sup. Ct. 1956)) ; and issued by the insurer with knowledge that it
was a required policy (Buzzone v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 23 N.J. 447, 129
A.2d 561 (1957)).
19. See 75 P.S. § 1417(e) (1959, April 29, P.L. 58 § 1417).
20. Effective in 47 states and the District of Columbia. Three states are silent
as to the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy; Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 324
1958)) ; Georgia (GA. COnE ANN. ch. 92a-6 (1958)), and Massachusetts (MASS.
EN. LAWS ch. 90, § 22, 22A, 34A-K (1959)). In Pennsylvania "a discharge in
bankruptcy following the rendering of .. . judgment shall not relieve the judgment
debtor from any of the requirements of this article." 75 P.S. § 1414 (1959, April 29,
P.L. 58 § 1414).
21. Twice in the U.S. Supreme Court; Kesler v. Dept. of Public Safety, supra
note 10. Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
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There are three avowed purposes of financial responsibility statutes:
first, to induce safety by imposing sanctions on negligent drivers; second,
to provide judgment creditors with additional means of recovery; and
third, to provide future victims with a source for recovery.22
Such a statutory scheme contains several weaknesses, the most notori-
ous of which i's that it does not necessarily protect the first victim of the
irresponsible driver. One can operate without insurance; it is only when
the accident has occurred that the statutes say "you shall not operate any
more until you have secured the claim of the injured and filed proof of
financial responsibility to respond in damages for any other accident that
may happen in the future. '2'  The mere suspension of the culprit's license
does little to insure the payment of the claim of the first victim of the
irresponsible driver.
Another problem is that of the "hit-and-run" driver. By their nature
financial responsibility statutes act on a known tort-feasor. They can do
nothing to alleviate the plight of the victim of the "hit-and-run." An addi-
tional weakness involves stolen automobiles or those driven without the
knowledge or consent of the owner. 24 As is the case in the compulsory
insurance area, most liability insurance policies (whether obtained volun-
tarily or under statutory requirement) do not include within their coverage
damages resulting from accidents when the insured vehicle is driven without
the knowledge or consent of the owner. The injured party must rely on the
thief or the uninsured driver for recovery. 2
The weaknesses 2 contained in both the compulsory insurance plan
and the financial responsibility statutes have led to the development of
new statutory methods by which fuller protection can be given to the victim
of the financially irresponsible motorist. One such development is the
Unsatisfied Judgment Fund.
22. Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, supra
note 5.
23. American Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Sterling Express Co., 91 N.H. 466,
470, 22 A.2d 327, 330 (1941).
24. See 75 P.S. § 1406 (1959, April 29, P.L. 58 § 1406), which states "The
requirements as to security and suspension of section 1404 (supra note 13) shall
not apply:
(3) To the owner of a motor vehicle, if at the time of the accident, the
vehicle was being operated without his permission, express or implied .. "
25. Unlike the Compulsory Insurance Statutes, the out of state driver poses no
problem. Generally the states have adopted reciprocity legislation in the legislative
field. Most states now, as a matter of comity interchange protection. See for example
Section 1405 of Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Provisions (75
P.S. § 1405 (1959, April 29, P.L. 58 § 1405)), which provides that if the operating
privilege of a resident of Pennsylvania is revoked by another state for failure to
comply with that states security requirements under circumstances that would have
resulted in suspension had the accident occurred in Pennsylvania - the Secretary
of Revenue shall suspend the license or registration in Pennsylvania until with the
law of such state. This provision applies only if the law of the other state contains
reciprocal provisions.
26. Other criticisms of financial responsibility statutes include: (1) there is no
evidence that the legislation operates to compel careless drivers to obtain insurance;
(2) there is no decrease in the number of accidents or any relation between the
number of accidents and the number of license revocations or suspensions. Report of
the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile. Accidents, 1932.
[VOL. 10
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A somewhat different approach adopted in several states27 is the
establishment of a fund available to the victim of an accident involving a
financially irresponsible or unknown motor vehicle operator. The fund is
created either by the joint contributions of the licensed drivers and insur-
ance companies writing automobile liability policies in the state or, as is
the case in New York, by the insurance companies alone. New Jersey on
the other hand requires every person registering an uninsured vehicle to
pay an extra registration fee in addition to the payments required of the
insurance writers. In each case the funds are administered by an appro-
priate state administrative agency or officer.
When an accident occurs and the wrongdoer is unable to respond in
damages after the judgment the injured party may by summary application
seek recovery from the fund. Notice to the appropriate official28 accom-
panied by estimates of the damage is required within a certain period after
the cause of action accrued.2 9 In addition the acts require that the applicant
shall have recovered judgment against the defendant and that all appeals
and time therefore have expired. The applicant must show that he has taken
execution and made every effort to satisfy the judgment including attach-
ment (returned partially or wholly unsatisfied) and discovery procedures.30
Four other provisions which must be met as a prerequisite to recovery
from the New Jersey fund are: (1) no workman's compensation award
can be available to the applicant; (2) the tort-feasor cannot be a member
of the immediate family of the applicant; (3) the applicant was not a
guest in the judgment debtor's car and (4) the applicant is not himself
an uninsured motorist. Where the claimant has received compensation for
his injury from other sources, such compensation is deductible from the
amount recoverable from the fund.
27. Maryland - MD. ANN. CODi art. 661 §§ 150-79 (1957); North Dakota -
N.D. Rrv. COme §§ 39-1701-10 (1960) ; New Jersey - N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-61, 91
(1954); New York - N.Y. CONSOL. LAW, Ins. Law art. 17-A § 600 (McKinney, 1959).
28. New Jersey and New York require notice of intention to seek recovery from
the fund within 90 days of the accident. N.J. Szss. LAWS ch. 99 § 2 (1959) ; N.Y.
CONSOL. LAWS art. 17-A § 608 (McKinney 1959). The purpose of the notice require-
ment is to allow an opportunity for a representative of the fund to appear and defend
against any specious claims of the injured party against the tort-feasor.
29. In New Jersey when notice of an action against an uninsured motorist is
received, the fund may assign an insured to defend the action. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
39:6-66(a) (b) (1961). The insurer which has been assigned may enter an appear-
ance through counsel on behalf or in the name of the uninsured motorist. The original
defendant has the right to employ his own counsel and defend the action against him.
If the fund does not participate in the action it will investigate any claims against it.
Investigation and defense of claims against the fund are distributed to each insurer
under an equitable plan.
30. N.J. Rrv. STAT. § 39:6-70 (1954). Suit may be maintained directly against
the fund when the identity of the owner or operator of the vehicle is:unknown. After
judgment against the fund it is subrogated to all rights the plaintiff has against the
unknown owner or operator.
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After a judge is satisfied of the inability of the defendant to respond
in damages he makes an order against the appropriate state officer to pay
out of the fund. Such orders are appealable. Upon payment by the fund
it is subrogated to all rights the plaintiff had against the uninsured driver,
for as a condition precedent to recovery the judgment creditor must assign
his judgment to the official in charge of the fund.3 1 Collection by non-
residents from the fund is authorized on a reciprocity basis for those coming
from a jurisdiction offering recourse of a "substantially similar character.
'32
A word about New York:33 in New York the fund is maintained
solely by contributions of the insurance companies. The carriers are
entitled to have the amount of this charge considered as a rating factor
in the determination of their premium rates. The statute creates a corpora-
tion known as the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation.
Every insurer writing motor vehicle liability policies in New York must
be a member and remain so as long as it continues to be authorized to write
insurance in the state. The Board of Directors of this corporation is made
up of elected representatives of the different companies and the enumerated
powers of the corporation include the right to levy assessments against
members of the corporation for a total amount sufficient (in the opinion
of the Board of Directors) for the operation of the corporation. Each
member contributes a proportionate share measured by the ratio of the
amount of liability insurance done in the state to the total amount of
business within the state.
34
The unsatisfied judgment fund approach can be used to meet either
or both of two problems. First, it can be used as a supplement to the
coverage of a compulsory liability insurance law, to take care of cases
which such a law cannot cover directly - for example, "the hit-and-run"
driver, the stolen car driver and the out-of-state uninsured driver. In
addition the fund plan also gives some measure of protection to even the
first victim of a financially irresponsible motorist (a distinct advantage
over the financial responsibility statutes). Second, however, it can be used
as a basic alternative to compulsory insurance, where its chief purpose
would be to provide recovery against the uninsured driver. Theoretically
such a law produces the same coverage as a compulsory insurance law since
either the defendant would be voluntarily insured or the plaintiff would be
permitted to proceed against the fund.
31. As might be expected the operator's license and/or registration of the debtor
will be suspended until he has reimbursed the state fund.
32. As of this writing this applies to only three other states. See supra note 23.
33. New York has combined the best of two worlds by enacting both the fund
and the compulsory uninsured motorist endorsement plan (to be discussed infra.) The
New York act is also supplementary to a compulsory insurance act and thus primarily
covers the victims of out of state drivers who are uninsured and the victims of hit-
and-run accidents.
34. For an excellent analysis and criticism of the New York act see Ward, New
York's Motor Vehicle Accident Ins. Corp., Past, Present and Future. Supra note 10.
[VOL. 10
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Two criticisms of the fund system have been made: that the insured
motorist is forced to pay part of the cost of the fund either directly or
through hidden costs imposed on the companies; and that the mechanics
and procedures for securing payment are cumbersome. Additionally, the
funds are not intended to make every claimant completely whole. In New
Jersey the stated maximum recovery from the fund for bodily injury or
death is $5,000 and $10,000 respectively.
IV.
COMPULSORY UNINSURED MOTORIST ENDORSEMENT PLANS
This type of statute operates directly on the insurance companies. In
every automobile liability insurance policy written in the state there must
be included an uninsured motorist endorsement clause. The standard
language contained in such a clause is as follows:
The insurer agrees to pay all sums which the insured or his legal
representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily
injury . . . including death . . . sustained by the insured caused by
accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such
uninsured automobile: provided, . . . determination as to whether the
insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover such
damages and if so the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement
between the insured or such representative and the insurer, or if they
fail to agree, by arbitration.
3 5
To summarize, to recover under an uninsured motorist endorsement, the
insured must have: (1) sustained injuries, (2) caused by an uninsured
motorist, (3) from whom he would be legally entitled to recover.
The purpose of the statute and the required clause is to give the
insured who has been injured by an uninsured motorist the same protection
he would have had if he had been injured by a motorist covered by the
standard liability policy.3 6 New Hampshire,3 7 Florida, 8 Virginia, 39 South
Carolina 40 and California 4' have adopted the compulsory uninsured motorist
endorsement requirement. Only Virginia and South Carolina, however,
extend coverage to property damage as well as personal injuries.
The Virginia statute is a prime example of this type of plan. The
financial burden of protecting victims of uninsured motorists is placed
35. Standard Policy, Part IV, Protection Against Uninsured Motorists, Cover-
age J, Policy Form 3650(p) (rev. 1-63) promulgated by the National Bureau of
Casualty Underwriters.
36. 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Auto Ins. § 135 (1963).
37. N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 268:15; § 412:2-A (Supp. 1961).
38. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0851 (Supp. 1963).
39. VA. CoDx ANN. § 38.1 (Supp. 1963).
40. S.C. CODE § 46-750.11 (1962).
41. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (1955).
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upon the uninsured motorists themselves by requiring them to pay an
additional registration fee. The money in turn is distributed to the various
insurance companies in proportion to the amount of uninsured motorist
coverage the company writes in Virginia each year.42 This distribution
has the effect of reducing the insured's premium costs.
Questions which frequently arise in connection with uninsured motorist
endorsements include a determination of: what is an uninsured automobile;
what persons are included within the coverage of the clause; how much is
recoverable; what is the effect of the arbitration clause and what are the
existing rights of subrogation.
What is an uninsured automobile? An uninsured automobile is defined
in the standard policy 48 as:
an'automobile . . . of which there is . . . no bodily injury liability
bond 44 or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident . . .
or with respect to which there is a bodily injury liability bond or insur-
ance policy applicable at the time of the accident but the company writ-
ing the same denies coverage thereunder . .. or a hit and run driver.45
What persons are included within the coverage of the clause? The
uninsured motorist provision is usually added to policies insuring against
other events; ordinarily it covers anyone defined as an insured under
the basic policy.
46
How much is recoverable under the clause? The insured can recover
all that he normally would recover in an action against the wrongdoer for
bodily injury up to the limits of his policy coverage. This includes the
dependents of those who are killed as well as the victims themselves.
47
Recovery under the uninsured motorist endorsement also provides for loss
of wages and income, loss of support, medical expenses and payments for
pain and suffering.
48
What is the effect of the arbitration clause? It must be understood
that the uninsured motorist endorsement does not promise payment of any
judgment obtained against the uninsured motorist ;49 but rather it promises
42. See Comment, Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Virginia, 47 VA. L. Rzv. 145
(1961), for a detailed analysis of Virginia's uninsured motorist endorsement plan.
43. Standard policy, supra note 31.
44. Such bond might be required by a state financial security act.
45. In Virginia the insured may sue an unknown hit and run operator by naming
the defendant as "John Doe." Service of process is then perfected by delivery of the
pleadings to the clerk of the court. Service upon the insurer is made in the usual manner.
46. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 469 (4th
Cir. 1960).
47. American Universal Ins. Co. v. Rasson, 59 Wash. 2d 811, 370 P.2d 867 (1962).
48. Remsen v. Midway Liquors, Inc., 30 11. App. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 7 (1961).
49. As a matter of fact the Standard Policy provides that any judgment obtained
by the insured against the uninsured motorist without the written permission of the
insurer will not be conclusive as against the insurer. Standard Policy, supra note 31.
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to pay only those sums which the insured would be legally entitled to
recover had he proceeded to judgment. This figure is determined (either
by arbitration or agreement) by the insurer and the insured or his legal
representative.5 0 Accordingly, the clause provides for impartial arbitration
of disputes which cannot be settled by direct negotiation between the
policy holder and the insurance carrier. The scope of the arbitration is
limited to two issues: the legal liability of the uninsured motorist and the
amount of damages suffered by the insured. In some states, however, an
agreement to arbitrate a future controversy is unenforceable. 51 Where
arbitration is prohibited, then the question of who shall control the defense
(in the judicial action between the insured and the uninsured motorist)
arises. Both the insured and the uninsured motorist have substantial
interests at stake. The insurer will have to pay any judgment rendered for
the insured. The uninsured motorist will be bound by any judgment
against him and will be liable to the insurer as subrogee of the insured's
claim. As a practical matter it would seem that the best results can be
obtained by a close association of the attorneys for both the insurer and
the uninsured motorist.
What are the existing rights of subrogation? Having paid the claim
of the insured, the insurance carrier must protect its own interest by
pursuing the claim against the culpable uninsured motorist via subrogation.
This may be accomplished by the use of a trust agreement contained in the
policies whereby the insured agrees to "hold in trust for the benefit of the
company all rights of recovery which he shall have against such other
person or organization because of the damages which are the subject
of the claim ... .52
As is the case with the judgment fund, the compulsory uninsured
motorist endorsement fills the gaps left by compulsory insurance and
financial responsibility legislation. The out of state driver poses no problem
since the endorsement applies whether the insured is involved in an accident
with a local or out of state driver. Express provision for the "hit-and-run"
driver is made by the inclusion of the "hit-and-run" motorist within the
definition of uninsured vehicle.
The burden of pursuing and collecting unsatisfied claims from the
negligent uninsured driver is shifted to the insurance carriers who can
better afford to wait months and even years for payment of the judgments.53
50. See the Standard Policy provision set forth in the text, supra.
51. Corbin, CONTRACTS § 1433 (1962). See also 135 A.L.R. 79 (1941). VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.1-381(g) (Supp. 1962); S.C. COD4 ANN. § 46-750.18 (1962). However,
it is generally held that an award is binding if the parties voluntarily enter upon the
arbitration and an award' is made therein. Duvall County v. Charleston Eng'r. &
Constr. Co., 101 Fla. 341, 134 So. 509 (1931); Oskaloosa Say. Bank v. Mahaska
County State Bank, 205 Iowa 1351, 219 N.W. 530 (1928).
52. Standard Policy, supra note 31, Part IV Trust Agreement. The trust agree-
ment includes suing in the insured's name at the company's expense.
53. The insurance carriers are entitled to the full use of financial responsibility
legislation to aid them in their collection of the unsatisfied judgments.
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Finally, those who do carry liability insurance will themselves be protected
from an uninsured motorist. It is submitted that this is an equitable result;
for a motorist who has the foresight and good sense to obtain liability
insurance benefits both himself and anyone with whom he is involved in an
accident. Those who care neither for their own financial security nor for
that of anyone they may negligently injure receive no protection.
These then are the methods by which financial protection is given to
the victim of the financially irresponsible motorist. New developments
such as the fund plan and the compulsory uninsured motorist endorsement
are offering fuller protection than previously available. It would seem
therefore that it is incumbent upon states such as Pennsylvania (whose
coverage is limited to the financial responsibility type of statute) to supple-
ment the rather incomplete protections afforded by the existing legislation
with the added safeguards of the newer developments now in use. When
the various statutory schemes are combined, as in New York, virtually
complete financial protection is available - at least to the extent of the
maximum amounts provided by the statutes.
54
Standing alone, the financial responsibility type of statute does not
guarantee compensation to the victim of the financially irresponsible
motorist. Such legislation merely aids the victim's recovery by imposing
the sanction of license or registration suspension on the wrongdoer. A
judgment debtor willing to sacrifice his driving or registration privileges
within a particular state can completely avoid the effect of the act. Again,
there is no reason why the benefits of legislation which protects the victims
of financially irresponsible motorists should not be extended to the victims
of the drivers of "hit-and-run" or stolen vehicles as well as to those
"fortunate" enough to be struck by a car which is driven with the permission
of the owner and which stops at the scene of the accident. 5
One can appreciate the innumerable problems which are involved in
effecting the new types of legislation discussed in this article; however,
one can also appreciate the fact that states such as New York, New Jersey,
Maryland, North Dakota, New Hampshire, Florida, Virginia, South Car-
olina and California have surmounted these problems and now offer more
complete protection to the victim of the financially irresponsible motorists
than does Pennsylvania.
Fredric C. Jacobs
54. It must be agreed, however, that the most complete financial protection that
can be devised is but a partial answer to a sociological phenomenon in which there is
an automobile death every thirteen minutes and an automobile injury every twenty-
three seconds.
55. See 75 P.S. § 1406 (1959, April 29, P.L. 58 § 1406) supra note 24.
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